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Abstract   This paper analyzes the relationship between fuzziness and bipolarity, no-
tions which were devised to address different kinds of uncertainty: linguistic impreci-
sion, in the former,  and knowledge relevance and character or polarity, in the latter. 
Although different types of fuzziness and bipolarity have been defined, these relations 
are not always clear. This paper proposes the use of four-valued extensions to provide 
a formal method to rigorously define and compare the semantics and logical structure 
of diverse combinations of fuzziness and bipolarity types. As a result, this paper claims 
that these notions and their different types are independent and not semantically 
equivalent despite its possible formal equivalence. 
1 Introduction 
Fuzziness [39] and bipolarity [11] are two independent but complementary notions 
originally (and separately) devised to face the mathematical modelling of different fea-
tures of natural languages and human reasoning. Though their influence (more than 
considerable in fields as decision theory [14,17,26,29] or machine learning [19]) has 
spread separately, in the last few decades both notions have started to appear together 
in many developments on these and other fields (see for instance [4,6,13,15,30, 
31,38]), which comes to show its high relevance as a topic of research inside soft com-
puting [20] and logics [36].  
However, the relationships (and differences) between fuzziness and bipolarity are 
not always clear. In order to introduce our point, let us remind that, on one hand, fuzzi-
ness is concerned with the imprecision inherent to natural languages: many relevant 
predicates (i.e. words) P, as good or young, have ill-defined boundaries, and uncer-
tainty arises regarding whether objects x of a universe of discourse X (e.g. decision al 
ternatives or ages of customers) fulfil them or not.  
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On the other hand, bipolarity is concerned with the character (or polarity) and 
relevance of information: it has become clear (see [7,25,28]) that human reasoning 
tends to analyze reality (e.g. a decision to be taken [23,29]) by checking separately 
both the positive and negative sides of the available information (e.g. an alternative 
could be good for certain criteria and bad for other set of criteria) in order to acquire a 
more expressive and relevant knowledge. Thus, reality is judged in terms of pairs of 
poles of reference P/Q, as false/true or good/bad, which organize and give relevance to 
the available information. 
Moreover, different types of fuzziness [40] and bipolarity [12] have been studied 
and defined. While usual (type-1) fuzziness (F1) measures linguistic imprecision in a 
precise way (assigning a gradable but precise truth-value ( ) [0,1]P xμ ∈  to the propo-
sition “x fulfils P”, thus modelling P as a fuzzy set), type-2 fuzziness (F2) enables such 
an imprecision to be measured imprecisely (since it assigns a fuzzy set of the truth 
scale [0,1] to " "x P∈ ).  
Similarly, while type-1 bipolarity (B1) relies on the idea that negative informa-
tion is just the negation or complementation of the positive one, type-2 bipolarity (B2) 
allows the relation between poles to be not so simple (for example bad not good≠ ), 
and thus evaluating the pair ( ( ), ( ))P Qx xμ μ  could be necessary in order to capture all 
relevant information.  
Notice that, as they try to address different kinds of uncertainty, fuzziness and bi-
polarity seem to be not necessarily related or interlinked: in principle a B2 formalism 
could be either an F1 or F2 (or even crisp!) model, and an F2 framework could be as-
sociated to either a B1 or B2 setting. Nevertheless, a commonly-used instance of type-
2 fuzziness, interval valued fuzzy sets (IVFS, see [18]), actually devised as B1 objects, 
has been shown (see [8,9]) to be in certain sense equivalent to Atanassov fuzzy sets 
(AFS, see [1]), which however were originally devised as F1 and B2 objects. In fact, 
as a consequence of this formal equivalence, a bitter dispute (see [10] and [3]) raised 
between Atanassov and his followers, on one side, and an important part of the fuzzy 
community, on the other, about the exact meaning of AFS and their real relevance in 
the context of bipolarity.  
The main objective of this paper is to shed some light on the relations between 
fuzziness and bipolarity from a different perspective, and try to lead the referred dif-
ferences between Atanassov and his detractors, apparently not totally solved, to a de-
finitive solution. For this aim, the notion of four-valued extension (that clearly resem-
bles that of preference structure) is used in order to rigorously define and compare the 
semantics and underlying logical structure of each possible combination of fuzziness 
and bipolarity types 1 and 2. This will allow us to separate and distinguish IVFS from 
AFS in a practical way, and will enable us to show the independency of fuzziness and 
bipolarity. AFS in a practical way, and will enable us to show the independency of 
fuzziness and bipolarity. AFS in a practical way, and will enable us to show the inde-
pendency of fuzziness and bipolarity. 
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This paper is organized as follows: the notions of type-1 and type-2 fuzziness are 
revised in Section 2, and those of type-1 and type-2 bipolarity will be revised in Sec-
tion 3. Four-valued extensions are introduced and applied to the four possible combi-
nations of bipolarity and fuzziness types in Section 4. Finally, some conclusions are 
shed in Section 5. 
2 Type-1 and type-2 fuzziness 
Since the first proposal of L.A. Zadeh in the middle-sixties of the last century (see 
[39]), fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic have enabled an increasingly sophisticated 
mathematical treatment of the imprecision inherent to natural languages. As said 
above, the imprecision of a predicate P entails uncertainty about whether objects x of a 
universe of discourse X verify it or not. Fuzzy logic addresses this uncertainty by al-
lowing the truth of the proposition “x verifies P” (i.e. " "x P∈ ) to be evaluated in the 
interval [0,1] (rather than in the classical, binary valuation space {0,1}). Therefore, the 
crisp index function of P is generalized into a membership function : [0,1]P Xμ →  
that specifies the degree up to which each object x verifies P. This enables objects to 
partially fulfil an imprecise predicate or, in other words, the semantics (or use, see 
[34]) of P on X is modeled as a (type-1) fuzzy set (T1FS) { }( , ( )) |PP x x x Xμ= ∈ .
  
Also, in response to some criticism raised about the possibility of obtaining to-
tally precise membership-degrees ( ) [0,1]P xμ ∈ , L.A Zadeh introduced in [40] the 
notion of type-n fuzziness by allowing to measure the truth of " "x P∈  by means of a 
type-n–1 fuzzy set of [0,1]. Particularly, if ([0,1])F  denotes the set of all type-1 
fuzzy sets of [0,1], a type-2 fuzzy set (T2FS) P is associated with a membership func-
tion : ([0,1])P X Fψ → , in such a way that ( ) : [0,1] [0,1]P xψ →  expresses the 
plausibility-degree of the proposition “x verifies P with truth-degree μ ” for each 
truth-degree [0,1]μ ∈ . Therefore, imprecision in the measurement of type-1 truth de-
grees ( )P xμ  is allowed and, in general, higher types of fuzziness enable further im-
precision to be introduced in truth degrees. 
  Perhaps the simplest and most used instance of type-2 fuzzy sets are interval-
valued fuzzy sets (IVFS, see [18]), which assign to each object x and predicate P an in-
terval [ ( ), ( )]L U Px xμ μ  as (equally and totally) plausible values of the truth degree 
( )P xμ . Therefore, the valuation space of IVFS is the set  
 { }[ , ] [0,1] | ([0,1])IL a b a b F= ⊆ ≤ ⊂ . 
Also, the wider an interval [ ( ), ( )]L Ux xμ μ  is, the bigger the uncertainty associated 
to it, where its length ( ) ( ) ( )U Lu x x xμ μ= −  is usually taken as the degree of uncer-
tainty inherent to such an evaluation. Thus, ( ) 0u x =  if there is not uncertainty about 
the degree up to which x verifies P, i.e. if ( ) ( ) ( )L P Ux x xμ μ μ= = .  
Classic logical connectives such as not, and, or can be generalized by means of 
different fuzzy operators. The usual negation [22] for type-1 fuzzy sets is given by 
( ) 1n μ μ= − , so that ( )P xμ¬ = ( ( ))Pn xμ , with P¬ =not-P. Notice also that the 
usual negation defined over IVFS is ([ ( ), ( )] ) [1 ( ),1 ( )]I L U P U L PLn x x x xμ μ μ μ ¬= − − . 
Also, t-norms and t-conorms [22,33] are usually taken as operators for conjunction 
and disjunction, respectively. Both connectives are related through the negation n, so 
that if T is a t-norm, then ( , ) [ ( ( ), ( ))]P Q P QS n T n nμ μ μ μ=  is a t-conorm. For T1FS, 
common examples of so related operators are the Lukasiewicz t-norm and t-conorm, 
respectively given, for , [0,1]a b∈ , by { }max 1,0a b a b= + −e , { }min ,1a b a b⊕ = + , or 
the minimum { }min ,a b a b∧ =  and the maximum { }max ,a b a b∨ = . For IVFS, 
these operators are extended as follows: 
 [ , ] [ , ] [ , ],[ , ] [ , ] [ , ]I Ia b c d a c b d a b c d a c b d= ⊕ = ⊕ ⊕e e e ,  
 [ , ] [ , ] [ , ], [ , ] [ , ] [ , ]I Ia b c d a c b d a b c d a c b d∧ = ∧ ∧ ∨ = ∨ ∨ . 
Notice that fuzzy logic seems to underestimate the notion of negative informa-
tion. If any, it assumes that the falsehood of " "x P∈  is equal to the truth of " "x P∉ , 
i.e. ( )P xμ¬ , though this falsehood could be of different nature than negative informa-
tion. Anyway, it is clear that fuzzy logic does not consider an extra, independent 
evaluation (being either a falsehood degree or a measure of negative information) to-
gether with the (precise or not) degrees ( )P xμ  or ( )P xψ . 
Typical applications of fuzzy logic (today more or less covered below the term soft 
computing [20]) include, among others, intelligent control [24],  decision theory [14] 
or machine learning [19]. Type-2 FS (specially IVFS) have also found extensive appli-
cation in various fields (see for example [6]). 
3 Type-1 and type-2 bipolarity 
Although the idea of measuring independent positive and negative information has a 
psychological inspiration (see [25,28]) and has appeared separately and without a uni-
tary label (and even not explicitly) in the scientific literature (specially that concerned 
with decision theory), quite recently the term bipolarity seems to have succeeded in 
becoming a widely accepted label for this rather general idea [11].  
Basically, bipolarity assumes the existence of a pair of reference poles P/Q, as 
false/true or good/bad, which provide absolute landmarks that confer information its 
intrinsic positive and negative character. Information having neither positive nor nega-
tive character is therefore irrelevant or neutral in terms of such references.  Thus, the 
poles P/Q organize and give relevance to the available information, so that positive in-
formation for one of the poles is taken as against the other. 
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If the relation between the poles P and Q is given by the complementation, i.e. 
Q not P P= = ¬  (e.g. bad=not good), then a single evaluation ( ) [0,1]P xμ ∈  (or 
( ) IP x Lμ ∈ ) is enough to capture all the information that is relevant in terms of the 
polarity P/Q, since then ( ) ( ) 1 ( )Q P Px x xμ μ μ¬= = −  and therefore the negative in-
formation is just the negation of the positive one. This situation is usually referred to as 
type-1 bipolarity (B1, see [13]), and let us remark that fuzzy sets (both F1 and F2) are 
usually assumed to belong to this category as exposed in last section. 
However, if the relation between P and Q is not so simple (e.g. bad not good≠ ), 
then it is usually also necessary to evaluate ( )Q xμ  in order to capture all the relevant 
information about " "x P∈ . Particularly, two different scales PL+  and PL−  can be used 
to evaluate, respectively, ( )P xμ  and ( )Q xμ , in such a way that the evidence couple 
( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))P P Q P Px x x x L Lμ μ μ μ+ − + −= ∈ ×  measures the degree of positive and 
negative information regarding " "x P∈ . Besides, if the relation between the poles is 
assumed to be symmetric (though it is possible to remove this assumption, see [31]), 
then 
   ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))Q Q P Q Q P Px x x x L L L Lμ μ μ μ+ − + − − += ∈ × = × . 
These bivariate evidences are typical of type-2 bipolarity (B2, see [13]), and note 
that, as P and Q are not necessarily complementary, B2 models in principle admits 4 
possible cases or epistemic states regarding an object x and the pair P/Q:  
• Positive truth t: x verifies P but does not verify Q, i.e., information is positive and 
not negative. The extreme (or crisp) representative of this state is given by the evi-
dence couple ( , ) (1,0)μ μ+ − = ;  
• Negative truth (or positive falsehood) f: x fulfils Q and does not verify P, i.e., in-
formation is negative and not-positive. Its extreme pair is ( , ) (0,1)μ μ+ − = ; 
• Irrelevance or neutrality i: x neither fulfils P nor Q, and thus information is both 
not-positive and not-negative, so in the limit it is ( , ) (0,0)μ μ+ − = ; 
• Conflict k: x simultaneously fulfil P and Q, so information is positive and negative, 
as in the crisp case ( , ) (1,1)μ μ+ − = . 
Let us remark that the third and fourth cases are not possible in B1 frameworks (as 
fuzzy logic), in which P and Q are tightly linked through the negation. If the relation-
ship between the poles is somehow restricted (for example, by introducing a constraint 
in L L+ −× ), the third or the fourth case could cease to hold, but not simultaneously: if 
this is the case, then we are back in a B1 setting.  
In relation with preference modelling and decision analysis, the notion of inde-
pendent positive and negative information has also appeared in, among others, cumula-
tive prospect theory (see [21,37]), outranking concordance-discordance ELECTRE 
methods (see [32]), Atanassov intuitionistic fuzzy sets (AFS, see [1]) and, more re-
cently, in DDT logic [35]. Current applications of type-2 bipolarity along with fuzzy 
logic are promising and increasing (see [15,29,30,38])  
It is interesting to examine in more detail the case of AFS, which assign to 
" "x P∈  both a degree of membership ( )P xμ  and an independent degree of non-
membership ( )P xμ¬ , such that ( ), ( ) [0,1]P Px xμ μ¬ ∈  and ( )P xμ + ( ) 1P xμ¬ ≤ , i.e, { }2 2( , ) [0,1] | 1 [0,1]L x y x y∗ = ∈ + ≤ ⊂  is the valuation space of AFS, and notice 
that the same scale [0,1]L L+ −= =  is used for both evaluations (though a constraint 
has been included). Note also that Atanassov implicitly treats a B1 framework (i.e. in 
which the relevant polarity is /P P¬ ) as a B2 one, assuming that the truth of 
" "x P∉  can not be  obtained from that of " "x P∈ , thus requiring an independent 
evaluation ( ) ( )P Px xμ ν¬ = . As it is ( ) ( ) 1P Px xμ ν+ ≤ , it is assumed that the disjunction 
of P and its negation (in terms of the Lukasiewicz t-conorm) could not be a tautology, 
thus violating the law of the excluded middle ( )P P∨¬ , that was Atanassov’s aim as he 
wanted its model to be intuitionistic.  
However, other fuzzy structures also violate such a law without considering an in-
dependent negation (for example, by taking the maximum t-conorm ∨  and 
( ) 1 ( )P Px xμ μ¬ = − ). Thus, the exact meaning of AFS is rather obscure, showing the 
semantics of a B1 framework while formally seeming to be a B2 one. Moreover, as 
Atanassov and his followers failed to give a clear definition of AFS’s underlying logi-
cal and semantical structure (see [27]),  no solid reasons to separate AFS from IVFS 
were available when both formalisms were proven [8,9] to be equivalent (through the 
isomorphism : IL L∗Φ →  given by 
   ( ( ), ( ) ) [ ( ),1 ( )]P P P Px x x xμ μ μ μ¬ ¬Φ = − ).  
This equivalence triggered a strong controversy (see [3,10]) between Atanassov and 
his followers, which thought AFS were a valid B2 model (or at least a valid intuitionis-
tic model) different from IVFS, and an important part of the fuzzy community, which 
instead thought the intuitionistic meaning of AFS was not clear at all and, since IVFS 
were formulated some years before than AFS, the relevance of the latter as bipolar ob-
jects should be reduced due to such equivalence (despite IVFS were originally con-
ceived as B1 objects).  
In our opinion, AFS’ original semantics (whatever it may be) is not of B2 type, and 
therefore AFS are not a really relevant landmark in the field of bipolarity. However, if 
ν  is interpreted as the membership function of a polarity Q such that Q P≠ ¬ , i.e. 
( ) ( )P Qx xν μ= , and the constraint ( ) ( ) 1P Px xμ ν+ ≤  is maintained, then a B2 se-
mantics (with a particular relation between  poles P and Q) is easily obtained, and our 
opinion is that these objects (which will be referred to as bipolar AFS: BAFS) are not 
semantically equivalent to IVFS. In order to support this last claim, we will formally 
define the semantics of B2 logical objects, and will show that semantics of BAFS (and 
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in general that of F1 and B2 formalisms) is different from that of IVFS (in general, 
from that of B1 and F2 models). Such a semantical differentiation will be introduced 
through the notion of four-valued extension.  
4 Four-valued extensions 
Given an evidence couple ( , )μ μ+ −  that evaluates the positive and negative information 
regarding " "x P∈ , how can we assess (and quantify) from such evidence whether x can 
be identified with the positive pole P (in the sense of having positive character or veri-
fying the positive truth epistemic state t) or not? In other words, what is the exact or 
relevant meaning or semantics of a given evidence couple? For example, the pair 
( , ) (1,0)μ μ+ − =  indicates that x has a fully positive character, and thus the positive 
truth of " "x P∈  can be assumed in this case to be maximum, i.e., 1. This could lead 
to think that t coincides with the truth of " "x P∈  (since ( ) ( ) 1Px xμ μ+ = = ) or the 
falsehood of Q (since ( ) 1 ( ) 1Qx xμ μ−¬ = − = ). 
However, the pairs (1,1) or (0,0) do not represent neither a prevalence of the 
positive pole over the negative one nor the reciprocal. Rather, they make it clear that in 
a B2 context, the truth of " "x P∈  (i.e. ( )P xμ ) should not be directly identified with 
the positive truth epistemic state t resulting from conjointly evaluating positive and 
negative information. Moreover, as in a fuzzy (F1 or F2), type-2 bipolar setting an ob-
ject x could be partially compatible with both poles P and Q, the associated evidence 
couple ( , )μ μ+ −  could be partially compatible with more than one of the epistemic 
states t, f, i, k described in last section. Therefore, these states are also gradable or 
fuzzy in nature, and the notion of 4-valued extension is useful to quantify these com-
patibilities (and thus the semantics of the evidence couple) under some reasonable as-
sumptions (as in preference modelling [14], where the 4 values of the preference struc-
ture are the relevant, final items of the analysis). 
Thus, supposing that L L L+ −= = , with each evidence couple 
( , ) L Lμ μ+ − + −∈ ×  there is associated an evidence matrix  
 ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
t i
EM
k f
μ μ μ μ
μ μ μ μ
+ − + −
+ − + −
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
obtained through the formulae  
 ( , ) , ( , )t fμ μ μ μ μ μ μ μ+ − + − + − + −= ∧¬ = ¬ ∧          (1) 
 ( , ) , ( , )W Wi kμ μ μ μ μ μ μ μ+ − + − + − + −= ¬ ¬ =e e , (2) 
where 1nμ μ μ¬ = = −o . Note that , , ,t f i k L∈ , and therefore EM assesses the 
degree up to which each of these four epistemic states hold in the same scale in which 
both μ+  and μ− are measured. The 4-valued extension given in formulae (1)-(2) was 
first proposed for the case L=[0,1] in [29] (and have been further analyzed in [36]), in 
which it is proven that it is the unique continuous t-norm-based extension simultane-
ously verifying that the states i and k are mutually exclusive (since if  i>0 then k=0 
and vice versa) and t f i k+ + +  1= . Notice that by exchanging the places of the 
Lukasiewicz t-norm e  and the minimum t-norm ∧ , a different extension is obtained 
(and in fact it is used in preference modelling, see [14]), in which the last equality also 
holds but now t and f are exclusive. Nevertheless, as we shall see, this last extension 
does not generalize classical truth and falsehood in the case in which Q P= ¬ , while 
that given by (1)-(2) does. 
Before we apply this extension to the different combinations of fuzziness and bi-
polarity types, we enunciate the following theorem, that states the properties verified 
by such an extension for the case IL L L+ −= = , i.e., in a simultaneous B2 and F2 
situation in which imprecision is allowed for the couple ( , )μ μ+ − : 
Theorem 1: Let [ , ]L Uμ μ μ+ + +=  and [ , ]L Uμ μ μ− − −=  ( 0 1L Uμ μ− −≤ ≤ ≤ , 
0 1L Uμ μ+ +≤ ≤ ≤ ) be the positive and negative interval-valued evaluations of a predi-
cate " "x P∈ . Let also [ , ]L Ut t t= , [ , ]L Uf f f= , [ , ]L Ui i i=  and [ , ]L Uk k k=  be 
the 4-valued extension associated to the pair ( , )μ μ+ − , obtained through the formulae 
(5)-(8). Then Lk  and Ui  as well as Li  and Uk  are mutually exclusive and it holds that 
1L L U U U U L Lt f i k t f i k m+ + + = + + + = + , where { }min , , , , ,t f u km u u u u u u+ −=  and 
U Lu μ μ+ + += − , U Lu μ μ− − −= − , t U Lu t t= − , f U Lu f f= − , i U Lu i i= − , k U Lu k k= −  
are the uncertainty degrees of each interval.  
Proof: Let us denote 1 L L U UM t f i k= + + + , 2 U U L LM t f i k= + + + , 
U
U Us μ μ+ −= + , L L Ls μ μ+ −= + , 1 L Us μ μ+ −= + , 2 U Ls μ μ+ −= +  and recall that  
 (1 ), (1 ), (1 ), (1 )L L U U U L L L U U U Lt t f fμ μ μ μ μ μ μ μ+ − + − − + − += ∧ − = ∧ − = ∧ − = ∧ −  
 (1 ) 0, (1 ) 0, ( 1) 0, ( 1) 0L U U U L L L L L U U Ui i k kμ μ μ μ μ μ μ μ+ − + − + − + −= − − ∨ = − − ∨ = + − ∨ = + − ∨ . 
Clearly, both Lk , Ui  and Li , Uk  are mutually exclusive. Then notice that 1s  deter-
mines the relation between  and 1L Uμ μ+ −− , since 1 1s <  (resp. 1 1s ≥ ) implies 
1L Uμ μ+ −< −  ( 1L Uμ μ+ −≥ − ) and therefore L Lt μ+=  and U Uf μ−=  ( 1L Ut μ−= −  and 
1U Lf μ+= − ). Similarly, 2s  determines the values Ut  and Lf , and thus the 4 possi-
ble situations of 1s  and 2s  wrt 1 produce four possible cases for Lt , Ut , Lf , Uf .  
On the other hand, Us  and Ls  determine, respectively, the values Li , Uk  and 
Ui , Lk  (e.g., 1
Us <  implies 1 ULi s= −  and 0Uk = ), but only 3 cases are now pos-
sible since the case 1Us < , 1Ls ≥  is excluded as it is L Us s≤ . Moreover, from the 
12 (4·3) cases in principle possible, 6 have to be removed since the constraints 
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Ls s≤ ≤ , 2 2Us s≤ ≤  and 1 2L Us s s s+ = +  also hold. Thus, this proof will con-
sist on showing that the equality 1 2 1M M m= = +  holds in each of these 6 cases: 
1) 1 2, , , 1
L Us s s s < : in this case it holds that 1 1 1L L L LM μ μ μ μ+ − + −= + + − − = , 
2 UM μ+= + 1 1U U Uμ μ μ− + −+ − − = , , , , 0t f i ku u u u u u u u+ − + −= = = + = , hence 0m=  and 
1 2 1M M m= = + . 
2) 1 2, , 1, 1
L Us s s s< ≥ : now it is 1 1 1L L L L U UM μ μ μ μ μ μ+ − + − + −= + + − − + + − =  
U
U U sμ μ+ −= + = , 2 UU UM sμ μ+ −= + = , , , 1 , 1L Ut f i ku u u u u s u s+ −= = = − = − , 
and since 1( 1) 1 0
Uu s s+ − − = − > , 2( 1) 1 0Uu s s− − − = − > , 1 ( 1)L Us s− − − =   
1 22 ( ) 2 ( ) 0
L Us s s s= − + = − + > , then 1Ukm u s= = −  and 1 2 1M M m= = + . 
3) 1 2, 1, , 1
L Us s s s< ≥ : it is 1 1 1 1L U L L U UM μ μ μ μ μ μ+ + + − + −= + − + − − + + − =  
1 1U L uμ μ− − −+ − = + , 2 1 1L UM uμ μ− − −= − + = + , 1 , 1,L Ut fu s u s= − = −  
1,Uiu s= −  1 Lku s= − , and it also holds that 2 1 0u u s s+ −− = − > ,  
11 1 0
Ls u s−− − = − > , 21 1 0Us u s−− − = − ≥ , so m u−=  and 1 2 1M M m= = +  
again.  
4) 2 1, 1, , 1
L Us s s s< ≥ : it is 1 1 1 1U L L L U UM μ μ μ μ μ μ− − + − + −= − + + − − + + − =  
1 1U L uμ μ+ + ++ − = + , 2 1 1U LM uμ μ+ + += + − = + , 1, 1 ,U Lt fu s u s= − = − 1 ,Liu s= −  
1Uku s= − . As 1 2 0u u s s− +− = − > , 21 1 0Ls u s+− − = − > , 1Us u+− − =  
1 1 0s − ≥ , it is m u+=  and 1 2 1M M m= = + . 
5) 1 21, , , 1
L Us s s s< ≥ : it is 1 1 1 1 1U U L L U UM μ μ μ μ μ μ− + + − + −= − + − + − − + + − =  
2 1 (1 )LL L sμ μ+ −− − = + − , 1 1 1 (1 )LU L LM sμ μ+ −= − + − = + − , , ,t fu u u u− += =  1 Liu s= − , 
1Uku s= − , and also 1(1 ) 1 0Lu s s+ − − = − ≥ , 2(1 ) 1 0Lu s s− − − = − ≥ , 
1 21 (1 ) 2 2 0
U L U Ls s s s s s− − − = + − = + − ≥ , thus 1 Lm s= −  and 1 2 1M M m= = + . 
6) 1 2, , , 1
L Us s s s ≥ : finally, it is 1 1 1 1 1U U U UM μ μ μ μ− + + −= − + − + + − = , 
2 1 1 1 1L L L LM μ μ μ μ+ − + −= − + − + + − = , , , 0,t f i ku u u u u u u u− + + −= = = = + , so 
it follows 0im u= =  and 1 2 1M M m= = + .                  ■ 
Next, Theorem 1 will be applied to different combinations of bipolarity and 
fuzziness types to illustrate its particular semantics: 
Type-1 fuzziness and bipolarity (F1,B1) 
In this case, L=[0,1] and Q P= ¬ , so it is Pμ μ+ =  and 
( ) 1P P Pnμ μ μ μ− ¬= = = − . This leads to t μ+= , f μ−=  and k = i = 0. Particu-
larly, m = 0 as uncertainty regarding the actual values of ,μ μ+ −  is not allowed. For 
example, let us suppose x X∈  such that ( ) 0.6P xμ = . Then we get the evidence 
couple ( , ) (0.6,0.4)μ μ+ − =  and the evidence matrix  
1
0.6 0
0 0.4
EM ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
Thus, the extension (4)-(5) generalizes fuzzy logic truth and falsehood (identified 
with Pμ and Pμ¬), and reflects the B1 semantics of this setting, that excludes k and i.  
Type-2 fuzziness and type-1 bipolarity (F2,B1) 
Suppose now that in the previous example, the value ( )P xμ  is not precisely 
known, but rather it is known that such a value lies in the interval [ ( ), ( )]L U Px xμ μ . 
Thus, it still is assumed Q P= ¬ , but now IL L=  and then [ , ]L U Pμ μ μ+ =   and 
([ , ] ) [1 ,1 ]I L U P U L PLnμ μ μ μ μ− ¬= = − − . Thus, it is again obtained t μ+=  and 
f μ−=  but now  [0, ]k i u= =  and m=u, with U Lu μ μ= −  the uncertainty associ-
ated to Pμ . For example, if [0.5,0.7]μ+ =  (and thus [0.3,0.5]μ− = ), the matrix   
2
[0.5,0.7] [0,0.2]
[0,0.2] [0.3,0.5]
EM ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
is obtained, showing that now the evaluations of positive truth t and falsehood f are 
also uncertain, allowing i and k to be non-zero. However, if uncertainty is reduced, i.e. 
as u tends to 0, k and i tend to [0,0], approaching the case (F1,B1).  
Type-1 fuzziness and type-2 bipolarity (F1,B2) 
If negative information about " "x P∈  is allowed to be independent from the nega-
tion n in the first case (F1,B1), then we obtain a B2 framework in which Q P≠ ¬ , 
Pμ μ+ = , Qμ μ− =   and [ ]0,1L L L+ −= = = . Thus, m=u=0, but t (f) can no more 
be identified with μ+  ( μ− ), and one of the states i,k can hold. For example, if 
( , ) (0.6,0.7)μ μ+ − = , we get the matrix 
3
0.3 0
0.3 0.4
EM ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
which shows that t μ+≠ , f μ−≠ and informs that information is partially conflictive 
(k=0.3), thus entailing t μ+<  and f μ−< .  
Similarly, notice that ( , )μ μ+ − = (0.5,0.3) L∗∈  is the evidence couple associated  
to the interval [0.5,0.7] IL∈  of the previous case by means of the isomorphism 
: IL L∗Φ →  (see Section 3), and it produces the evidence matrix 
4
0.5 0.2
0 0.3
EM ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
It is 2 4EM EM≠ , and not only because EM2  does introduce uncertainty while EM4 
does not. If uncertainty u is reduced, then it could be 
2
[0.5,0.5]EMμ+ = , in such a way 
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that 
2 4
[0.5,0.5] 0.5EM EMt t= = = , but then it is 2 4[0.5,0.5] 0.3EM EMf f= ≠ =   and 
2 4
[0,0] 0.2EM EMi i= ≠ =  as  2 2( ) [0.5,0.5]IEM EMLnμ μ− += =  due to the B1 setting of IVFS. 
However, BAFS allows μ−  to be independent from μ+  since they exhibit a type-2 
bipolarity, though the condition 1μ μ+ −+ ≤  entails that k=0. Thus, it is clear that se-
mantics of BAFS is different from that of IVFS, and their equivalence should be re-
garded as a formal coincidence between two scales that belong to different universes, 
since [0,1] ([0,1])IL F⊂ ⊂  while [ ]20,1 ([0,1]) ([0,1])I IL L L F F∗ ⊂ ⊂ × ⊂ × . 
Type-2 fuzziness and bipolarity (F2,B2) 
Finally, suppose that uncertainty about ,μ μ+ −  is allowed in a B2 setting, in such a 
way that an evidence couple ( , ) I IL Lμ μ+ − ∈ ×  is obtained. Notice that this case 
generalizes all the previous ones and corresponds to the hypothesis of Theorem 1. 
Thus, if [0.5,0.7]μ+ =  and [0.6,0.9]μ− = , we get the evidence matrix   
5
[0.1,0.4] [0,0]
[0.1,0.6] [0.3,0.5]
EM ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
and notice that now each of its elements have a different associated uncertainty (and 
m=0) and that these results extend those of EM1, EM2 and EM3. Note also that either 
u+  or u−  can be reduced without affecting the other, and in the limit case in which 
0u u+ −= = , a F1 and B2 setting is reached. Instances of B2 and F2 objects are 
Atanassov IVFS (AIVFS, see [2]), though the same argument of Section 3 applies in 
order to affirm that they can not be seen as B2 objects unless it is assumed the exis-
tence of a negative pole Q P≠ ¬  (leading to bipolar AIVFS). 
5 Conclusions 
The notions of fuzziness and bipolarity have been revised, and its relations analyzed. 
As these notions were developed to address different kinds of uncertainty, respectively 
linguistic imprecision and information relevance and polarity, both of them are in fact 
complementary and independent. An F2 object could be B2 or not, and reciprocally a 
B2 formalism could allow uncertainty (thus being also a F2 object) or not. Particularly, 
in this paper these differences have become formally evident, clarifying some aspects 
of the relations between B1,F2 formalisms and B2,F1 ones, and hopefully allowing to 
lead to an at least relative solution over the controversy between Atanassov’s support-
ers and critics. As this paper implicitly shows, there is a difference between intuition-
ism (in the sense of using a sub-additive negation ( ) 1n μ μ≤ − ) and bipolarity. How-
ever, if   Q P≠ ¬  is assumed, then BAFS and BAIVFS have been shown to be 
relevant B2 objects. Table 1 presents a summary of the cases and formalisms analyzed 
in this paper, which have been shown to exhibit a different semantics in terms of four-
valued extensions, and thus in terms of its ability to model knowledge states. 
 Table 1. Combinations of bipolarity and fuzziness types-1 and 2. 
Fuzziness
Bipolarity 
Type-1 (F1) Type-2 (F2) 
Type-1 (B1) T1FS T2FS, IVFS 
Type-2 (B2) BAFS, BFS BT2FS, BAIVFS
Further work is forthcoming in order to extend this work in several directions: lat-
tices (see [5] and notice that all formalisms in Table 1 are special cases of L-fuzzy sets 
[16]) will be introduced in order to obtain a more rigorous and general logical and 
formal setting. The relations between the notions of bipolarity and intuitionism, the use 
of a sub-additive negation and dissimilarity operators [31] will be further explored (see 
[15]), as well as the possible use of a F2 formalism in order to combine fuzziness and 
other types of uncertainty theories. 
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